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INSURANCE-THE STANDARD OF INTENT IN INSURANCE CON­
TRACT INTERPRETATION-Ambassador Insurance Company v. 
Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). 
The exclusion of intentional injury from [insurance] coverage 
stems from a fear that an individual might be encouraged to in­
flict injury intentionally if he was assured against the dollar con­
sequences .... Pulling the other way is the public interest that 
the victim be compensated, and . . . the victim is aided by the 
narrowest view of the policy exclusion consistent with the pur­
pose of not encouraging an intentional attack. And the insured, 
in his own right, is also entitled to the maximum protection con­
sistent with the public purpose the exclusion is intended to 
serve. l 
In the early morning hours of May 11, 1973, a fire broke out 
in the staiIwell of a two-and-a-half story, four-family house in 
Passaic, New Jersey. The blaze spread rapidly,.through the old 
wooden tenement building and killed four persons. Joseph Satkin, 
a real estate agent and landlord of the building, had procured 
Dennis Priest 2 to set the fire. Satkin hoped to collect the proceeds 
of a fire insurance policy covering the building. 3 Instead, he was 
tried and convicted of arson, conspiracy to commit arson, and fel­
ony murder for having intentionally caused the fire. 4 'Rafael Mon­
tes, as administrator ad prosequendam and as general administra­
tor, brought a civil action against Satkin for the death of Marilyn 
Ortega Perez, an infant who perished in the blaze. 5 
The Ambassador Insurance Co., which had issued a compre­
hensive general liability policy to Satkin, instituted a declaratory 
judgment proceeding. The insurance company contended that 
1. Burd v. Sussex Mut. Ins. Co., 56 N.J. 383, 267 A.2d 7, 15 (1970) (citations 
omitted). 
2. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 147 N.J. Super. 286, 290, 371 A.2d 292, 294 
(App. Div. 1977), affd, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). The policy was issued to 
Satkin on or about April 18, 1973, approximately one month before the fire. Brief for 
Defendants-Appellants at 3. 
3. It should be noted that "[olne who commits arson may be found guilty of the 
murder of an inhabitant of the dwelling who lost his life in the fire although per­
sonal injury was neither intended nor expected." R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL 
LAW 38 (2d ed. 1969). 
4. Ambassador Ins. Co. v. Montes, 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). 
5. Id. The wrongful death action was placed on the inactive trial calendar 
pending final disposition of the insurer's declaratory judgment proceeding. 
813 
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Satkin was not entitled to coverage under the policy because he 
deliberately started the fire. Since insurance coverage is generally 
denied for injuries caused by intentional acts, 6 the trial court exam­
ined Satkin's intent. It concluded that the deaths and injuries were 
the intended results of a deliberate act. Consequently, the court 
denied coverage under the policy. The New Jersey Superior Court 
reversed, reasoning that although Satkin's act was in wanton and 
reckless disregard for the safety of those living in the building, he 
did not specifically intend to injure or kill anyone. The deaths and 
injuries were, according to the court, the unintended consequences 
of a wilful act. Since there was no intent to injure, coverage under 
the policy was allowed. In Ambassador Insurance Company v. 
Montes,7 the New Jersey Supreme Court affirmed the appellate 
court's decision but omitted any discussion of the issue of intent. 
The court determined that the insurance policy clearly obligated 
Ambassador to pay, on Satkin's behalf, the damages for the Perez 
child's death. 8 The court reached this decision by ignoring the lan­
guage in Satkin's insurance policy which was designed to exclude 
coverage for injuries caused by intentional acts. Had the court 
given effect to this exclusionary language, it could then have re­
solved the question of what level of intent should be necessary to 
provide insurance coverage under a liability policy. 
The Ambassador decision can best be understood by viewing 
it in the context of the gradual developments in insurance law. 
Throughout its history, insurance has been alternately hailed as a 
promoter of commercial welfare and damned as a generator of 
evil. 9 Fire insurance was once regarded with suspicion as a tempta­
tion to commit arson. 10 Liability insurance was considered illegal 
because it encouraged the insured to disregard the safety of oth­
ers.ll Opponents of insurance argued that the protection afforded 
the insured by the liability policy removed the financial deterrent 
against negligent and criminal acts,12 Under the modern view, 
however, insurance is an accepted arrangement for transferring and 
distributing risk. 13 
6. See notes 72-95 infra and accompanying text. 
7. 76 N.J. 477,388 A.2d 603 (1978). 
8. Id. 
9. McNeely, Illegality as a Factor in Liability Insurance, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 
26 (1941). 
10. Simon, Insurance Coverage for Illegal Acts, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 37 (1970). 
11. ld. 
12. McNeely, supra note 9 at 26. 
13. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAw § 1.2(a), at 2 (1971). 
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True liability insurance apparently started with employers' lia­
bility insurance. 14 It was initiated, not to provide compensation for 
injured employees, but to protect the employer against litigation 
growing out of employers' liability acts.15 Liability insurance began 
as a measure of individual protection rather than as a scheme for 
social betterment. Since then, however, there has been a substan­
tial reversal in popular thinking, in the approach of courts today 
and in legislative trends towards the socialization of risk through 
insurance. 16 
The legality of liability insurance was accepted by courts partly 
due to the fairness of insurers in settling early claims. 17 As insur­
ance satisfied these claims, new demands were made for protection 
against new risks. IS Liability insurance expanded "like a New 
England farmhouse, with unplanned additions stuck on as occasion 
demanded. "19 
The scope of insurance has reflected these changes in public 
policy. Courts first accepted the right to insurance protection for a 
wrongdoer's acts in cases involving an insured's own negligence. 20 
Other decisions concerning wanton and reckless conduct permitted 
recovery where the insured's act was unintentional. 21 Current atti­
tudes toward the scope of insurance coverage are exemplified by 
the New Jersey Superior Court's decision of Rotwein v. General 
Accident Group. 22 The court held that for an insurance contract to 
14. McNeely, supra note 9 at 28. 

The idea of indemnity against the legal liability of one person for injuries he 

has caused to a person or the property of a third person is not a recent in­

vention. An interesting analogy can be drawn between the modem institu­

tion of liability insurance and the wergeld of the Anglo-Saxons in which. a 

group stood mutually liable for the criminal acts of its members. A less su­
ru:::.rAroi!ll !lIn!llnCTv 1THIV h~ fn,l1nrl ;n th~ rU"I'l,,;cinn nf T'rHu"inp .ncl1ran ....,:. 
r~~"'1~ ... ~ .....~ ...................OJ ....._J ....,...., ....................... ...... ....... ...., .t""........ .................. ....... ........................ .......... ~.. - ....... ...., 
whereby an insurer undertook the risk of liability of the insured for damage 
inflicted on other ships through collision. 
ld. at 27. 





20. Waters v. Merchants Ins. Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213 (1837). The steamboat 
Lioness was lost by an explosion of gun powder cargo due to an employee's negli ­
gence. The Court held, "There is nothing unreasonable, unjust, or inconsistent with 
public policy, in allowing the insured to insure himself against all losses from any 
perils not occasioned by his own personal fraud." ld. at 221. 
21. Simon, supra note 10 at 40. 
22. 103 N.J. Super. 406, 247 A.2d 370 (1968). "It must be emphasized that pub­
lic policy will usually not be applied to invalidate a contract unless there is some de­
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be unenforceable, it must be patently offensive or inimical to the 
public welfare and have a clear capacity to support or encourage 
conduct which is deleterious, antisocial or unlawful. 
Although courts recognize that a wrongdoer has a right to cov­
erage, they have only reluctantly extended that coverage to indi­
viduals who intentionally cause injury.23 They have held that pub­
lic policy prohibits an insurer 'from agreeing to indemnify an 
insured against the civil consequences of his own wilful acts. 24 
Most courts assume that antisocial conduct would be encouraged if 
insurance were available to shift the financial cost of the loss from 
the wrongdoer to his insurer.25 This public policy is further ratio­
nalized as a matter of moral principle, since a wrongdoer should 
not be permitted to receive insurance proceeds for an intentionally 
inflicted injury.26 If insurance coverage is allowed when the in­
sured intentionally injures a third party, the wrongdoer is spared 
the financial cost of his own wrong. Denying the wrongdoer the 
right to shift the financial responsibility to his insurer is a means of 
punishing the wrongdoer for his wilful act. 27 
With this background, the New Jersey Supreme Court ana­
lyzed the comprehensive general liability policy issued to Joseph 
Satkin. The policy provided: 
The company will pay on behalf of the Insured all sums which 
the Insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages be­
cause of. . . bodily injury or . . . property damage to which this 
finite basis therefor in law, legal precedent or recognized governmental policy affect­
ing the general welfare." Id. at 416-17,247 A.2d at 376 (citation omitted). 
23. "If the single insured is allowed through intentional or reckless acts to con­
sciously control risks covered by the policy, a central concept of insurance is vio­
lated." Bituminous Cas. Co. v. Bartlett, 240 N.W. 2d 310, 313 (Minn. 1976). 
24. See Taylor v. John Hancock Mut. Ins. Co., 11 Ill. 2d 227, 142 N.E.2d 5 
(1957); Ruvolo v. American Cas. Co., 39 N.J. 490, 189 A.2d 204 (1963); Malanga v. 
Manufacturers Cas. Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958); Lyons v. 'Hartford Ins. 
Group, 125 N,J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 332, 
315 A.2d 411 (1974). 
25. Farbstein & Stillman, Insurance for the Commission of Intentional Torts, 
20 HASTINGS L.J. 1219, 1245-46 (1969). One judge cited testimony in a case stating 
that as the plaintiff and defendant were riding in the latter's car, the plaintiff pro­
tested against the defendant's reckless driving. " 'Don't worry,' the defendant said, 'I 
carry insurance.' A moment later came the crash." McNeely, supra note 9, at 33. The 
case was Herschensohn v. Weisman, 80 N.H. 557, 119 A. 705 (1923). 
26. Farbstein & Stillman, Sf"':m note 25; Ruvolo v. American 490, 189 A.2d 204 
(1963). In this declaratory judgment action brought by the Ambassador Insurance 
Co., however, it is not the insured who would be benefited by receiving the insur­
ance proceeds, but the Perez family. 
27. See note 26 supra. 
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Insurance applies, caused by an occurrence and the company 
shall have the right and duty to defend any suit against the In­
sured seeking damages on account of such bodily injury or prop­
erty damage, even if any of the allegations of the suit are 
groundless, false or fraudulent....28 
Both parties agreed that the record. was limited to the policy in ev­
idence which contained neither a definition of "occurrence" nor a 
provision which excluded coverage for intentional acts. 29 With the 
record so limited, the court found that, on its face, the insurance 
policy obligated Ambassador to defend this action. The court held 
that the policy ostensibly obligated Ambassador to pay on Satkin's 
behalf any amount, up to the policy's stated limits, for the injuries 
suffered and for the death of Marilyn Ortega Perez. 30 
Once the court clarified Ambassador's obligation under the in­
surance contract, it then examined the policy considerations in­
volved in allowing insurance coverage. Ambassador had contended 
that public policy prohibits an insurer from agreeing to indemnify 
an insured against the civil consequences of his own wilful acts.31 
The court rationalized, however, that when an innocent third per­
son receives the protection afforded by the wrongdoer's insurance, 
this policy should not prevail. 32 The court employed the equitable 
remedy of subrogation to provide the Perez family the protection 
afforded by Satkin's insurance. 33 The court held that this' remedy 
would give Ambassador a cause of action against Satkin for its pay­
ment of his debt to the Perez family while also effectuating the 
28. 76 N.J. at 481,388 A.2d at 605. 
29. Id. at n.l, 388 A.2d at 605 n.1. The court, contending it was bound by stipu­
lations of fact, did not discuss t..he meaning of "occurrence" or the exclusionary pro­
visions for injuries resulting from intentional acts. 
30. Id. at 481-82,388 A.2d at 605-06. 
31. See note 24 supra and accompanying text. 
32. 76 N.J. at 482,388 A.2d at 606. 
33. Subrogation is an ancient equitable device to compel the iiltimate dis­
charge of an obligation by one who in good conscience ought to pay it. In a 
comprehensive review of the nature of the doctrine and its relation to in­
demnity, Mr. Chief Justice Vanderbilt pointed out that the right 'does not 
arise out of contract but rather exists without the consent of the insured, al­
though of course the parties may by agreement waive or limit the right'; the 
subrogee 'in effect steps into the shoes of the insured and can recover only 
if the insured likewise could have recovered'; and it is now the settled rule 
that generally an action in subrogation 'on the contractual obligation of the 
defendant to an insured exists in favor of the insurer.' 
George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20,28-29, 109 A.2d 805, 
809 (1954) (citations omitted). 
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public policy of forcing the wrongdoer to accept the financial re­
SpOI sibility arising from his intentional act. 34 
The Ambassador court recognized the importance of com­
pensating individuals who have been injured by some criminal 
act. 35 Never questioning whether Satkin intended the death of 
Marilyn Ortega Perez, it sought some means to provide compensa­
tion to the Perez family. The court determined· that Ambassador 
had contracted to pay an innocent person for the damages caused 
by its insured. It held such payments should be made, even 
though ascribable to a criminal event, so long as the benefit of the 
payment would not inure to Satkin. 36 The court stated that it was 
equitable and just for Ambassador to pay Satkin's d~bt and subse­
quently be indemnified by Satkin for its payment to the Perez fam­
ily.37 
The New Jersey Court's use of subrogation comports with the 
idea that it is used "to compel the ultimate discharge of an obliga­
tion by one who in good conscience ought to pay it. "38 The basic 
premise of subrogation is that one person, having paid the obliga­
tion of another, is substituted as the owner of a lawful claim or 
34. 76 N.J. 477,388 A.2d 603 (1978). 
35. This public policy has been codified in the New Jersey Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act of 1971. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:4B-1O (West Supp. 1978). 
§ 52:4B-IO. Persons entitled to compensation; order 
In any case in which a person is injured or killed by any act or omission 
of any other person which is within the description of the offenses listed in 
section 11 of this act, the board may ... order the payment of compensation 
in accordance with the provisions of this act: 
a. to or on behalf of the victim, 
c. in the case of the death of the.victim, to or for the benefit of the de­
pendents of the deceased victim, or anyone or more of such dependents. 
In determining whether to make an order under this section, the 
board may consider any circumstances it determines to be relevant, 
including provocation, consent or the behavior of the victim which di­
rectly or indirectly contributed to his injury or death, the prior case his­
tory, if any, of the victim and any other relevant matters. 
An order may be made under this section whether or not any person 
is prosecuted or convicted of any offense arising out of such act or omis­
sion.... 
Some of the offenses to which the statute applies are as follows: assault constituting 
a high misdemeanor; mayhem; threats to do bodily harm; lewd, indecent, or obscene 
acts; murder; manslaughter and rape. N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:4B-11 (1971). 
36. 76 N.J. at 483,388 A.2d at 606. 
37. Id. at 486,388 A.2d at 608. 
38. George M. Brewster v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N.J. 20, 28, 109 A.2d 805, 
809 (1954). 
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right. 39 The substitute succeeds to the other in relation to the debt 
or claim and its rights, remedies or securities. 4o In the absence of 
subrogation, either the insured would collect twice and be unjustly 
enriched,41 or, if the insured were not entitled to double recovery, 
the third party wrongdoer would avoid the financial obligation 
arising from his tortious, act. 42 
The New Jersey Supreme Court also realized that subrogation 
does not depend on contract language. 43 An insurer is generally 
entitled to subrogation, either by contract or in equity for the 
amount of the indemnity paid. 44 "The right of subrogation, or more 
properly indemnification where sought from its own insured, is en­
forced where denying such a remedy would be inequitable. "45 It 
will be applied according to the dictates of equity, good conscience 
and considerations of public policy.46 This doctrine is founded 
.39. Meyers, Subrogation Rights and Recoveries Arising out of First Party Con­
tracts, 9 FORUM 83 (1973). 
40. Id. 
41. "The general rule is that the assured should make no profit from his insur­
ance, the insurance being an indemnity and nothing more." Hodgin, Subrogation in 
Insurance Law, 1975 J. Bus. L. 114, 116. In this declaratory judgment action brought 
by Ambassador, however, it is not the insured who is seeking the benefit of the in­
surer's payment, but an innocent third Qarty. 
42. Standard Accident Ins. Co. v. Pellecchia, 15 N.J. 162, 104 A.2d 288 (1954). 
"Manifestly it would be unjust to compel the insurer to suffer the consequences of 
the wrongful act of another." Auto Owner's Protective Exch. v. Edwards, 82 Ind. 
App. 558, 563, 136 N.E. 577, 579 (1922). In this declaratory judgment action brought 
by Ambassador, however, it is not a third party wrongdoer who would avoid financial 
responsibility by the insurer's payment, but Satkin, the named insured. 
43. 76 N.J. 477, 388 A.2d 603 (1978). See generally 6A J. ApPLEMAN, INSUR­
ANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4054, at 142-46 (1962). 
44. Id. 
45. 8 J. APPLEMAN, iNSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE § 4935, at 461 (1973). The 
distinction between indemnification and subrogation should be noted. The term "in­
demnification" refers to those situations in which an individual is compensated for a 
loss already incurred. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Williams, 148 Md. 289, 
129 A. 660, 664 (1925). The term "subrogation," however, is used to describe the sit­
uation in which an individual who has paid the debt of another is substituted to all 
rights and remedies of the other. The debt is treated in equity as still existing for the 
benefit of the person who actually paid the debt. Callan Court Co. v. Citizens & S. 
Nat'l Bank, 184 Ga. 87, 133, 134, 190 S.E. 831, 856 (1937). In the typical subrogation 
situation, the insurance company indemnifies the insured for its loss and is then sub­
rogated to any rights that the insured may have against a third party who caused the 
loss. George M. Brewster & Son v. Catalytic Constr. Co., 17 N . .b 20, 109 A.2d 805 
(1954). In this declaratory judgment action, however, it is a third party who has sus­
tained a loss and is seeking the benefit of the insured's comprehensive general lia­
bility policy. The proper term for describing the payment Satkin must make to Am­
bassador is "indemnification." 
46. 6A J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw AND PRACTICE, § 4054, at 142-46 (1962). 
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upon equitable principles and upon the relationship of the par­
ties. 47 "Subrogation rests on the maxim that no one should be 
enriched by another's loss. "48 Consequently, courts usually invoke 
subrogation unless its application would be inimical to public pol­
icy. 49 
The court further supported its decision by referring to cases 
in which individuals have been allowed to recover losses occa­
sioned by an insured's intentional act. 50 In re Estate of Gardi­
nier,51 suggests that when an accident happens, an injured party 
acquires an interest in the insurance policy which cannot be fore­
closed by litigation or agreement between the insurer and the in­
sured alone. 52 Thus, the Perez family obtained benefiCiary status in 
the liability policy. 
47. Id. 
48. Id. at 143. 
49. Burford v. Glasgow Water Co., 223 Ky. 54, 2 S.W.2d 1027 (1928). 
50. 76 N.J. at 483-84, 388 A.2d at 606. See Malanga v. Manufacturers' Cas. Ins. 
Co., 28 N.J. 220, 146 A.2d 105 (1958). An insurance policy issued to a partnership 
was held to provide insurance coverage to partners not involved in an assault and 
battery committed by one partner. The issue ofthat partner's "liability to the defend­
ant insurer under its right of subrogation" was in no way affected. 28 N.J. at 230, 146 
A.2d at 1l0. Morgan v. Greater N.Y. Tax Payers Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 305 N.Y. 243, 112 
N.E.2d 273 (1953). The New York Court of Appeals held that a public liability policy 
extended coverage to the individual insured for liability for assault and battery 
committed by him or at his direction, even though committed by his partner. The 
policy was issued to the members of the copartnership as individuals and insured 
against liability for assault and battery unless committed by or at the direction of the 
insured. "To indemnify him does not save him from the consequences of his crimi­
nal act for he committed none." 305 N.Y. at 248, 112 N.E.2d at 275. Fidelity-Phenix 
Fire Ins. Co. v. Queen City Bus & Transfer Co., 3 F.2d 784 (4th Cir. 1925). A fire in­
surance company was compelled to pay the proceeds of a fire insurance policy to the 
corporation to be used for creditors and stockholders other than the wrongdoing 
president who had intentionally set fire to a bus owned by the corporation and on 
which he held a mortgage. The dissenting opinion distinguished the cases relied 
upon by the majority by pointing out that in each case the "party recovering from the 
insurance carrier was an express beneficiary...." 76 N.J. at 497, 388 A.2d at 613 
(Clifford, J" dissenting). 
51. 40 N.J. 261,191 A.2d 294 (1963). 
52. Id. Liability insurance has come to be used openly and extensively as a de­
vice for securing compensation to victims. Liability policies usually provide that, 
"No action shall lie against the company ... until the amount of the insured's obliga­
tion shall have been finally determined either by judgment against the insured after 
actual trial or by written agreement of the insured, the claimant and the company." 
Consequently, the insured may proceed against an insurer under the payment provi­
sions when a victim obtains a tort judgment. "[A]t that time, the victim may proceed 
against the insurer by garnishment or otherwise, even without the insured's 
cooperation.... in this limited sense, the victim may be referred to as a third party 
beneficiary of the liability insurance contract." R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(b), 
at 233-34 (1971). 
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As beneficiaries under this theory of recovery, the Perez fami­
ly's interest in the policy could not 'be denied because of Satkin's 
arson. This theory was discussed in Howell v. Ohio Casualty Co. 53 
In Howell, an innocent spouse received the proceeds from a fire 
insurance policy after her husband intentionally set fire to the 
property they owned as tenants by the entirety. The court declined 
to impute the husband's fraud to the wife. 54 It stressed that one 
party having rights under the policy is not penalized for the wrong­
ful acts of another. Applying this principle to the Perez family's 
right to recovery, Satkin's criminal act would not preclude the fam­
ily's right to insurance coverage. 
The New Jersey Supreme Court's conclusion is sound. If a lia­
bility policy ostensibly provides coverage for an insured intentional 
wrongdoer, an injured third party should be afforded insurance 
coverage. The insurer can subsequently be indemnified by the in­
sured. 55 In the instant case, however, this approach is flawed be­
cause of twoc erroneous assumptions. The first is that Satkin in­
tended to cause Marilyn Ortega Perez' death. The second is that 
the policy contained no provision which would exclude insurance 
coverage for injuries caused intentionally. The latter assumption 
completely overlooks the major purpose of insurance, the socializa­
tion of risk from accidental rather than intentional losses. 56 
Satkin's policy explicitly limited insurance coverage to dam­
ages "caused by an occurrence."57 "Occurrence" was defined as "an 
accident ... which results in bodily injury or property damage 
neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in­
sured. "58 If Satkin meant to cause .the Perez child's death, then 
53. 130 N.J. 350, 327 A.2d 240 (App. DivA974). 
54. ld. at 354. 
55. See notes 31-49 supra and accompanying text. 
56. R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § l.2(a), at 2 (1971). 
57. In 1966, insurance companies began using the term "occurrence" in their 
liability insurance forms, hoping that the use of this term would eliminate the need 
for an exclusion of intentionally caused injury. It had once been common for all lia­
bility policies to express coverage intent by way of the word "accident" but, because 
of the many legal problems which arose from its use in that context, it was aban­
doned. Other reasons for using "occurrence" were to eliminate the necessity of prov­
ing the exact moment at which damage was sustained (Le., to clarify whether an acci­
dent must happen "suddenly" or whether it may result from a gradual process) and 
to guarantee that the incident happened within the policy period. The definition fur­
ther specifies that the loss must be "neither expected not intended from the stand­
point of the insured" thus solving the problem of whether the accident should be 
viewed from the position of the insured or injured party. [Cas. and Sur. Section]. 
FIRE CAS. & SUR. BULLETINS (Nat'l Underwriters Co.) Occ-l (1978). 
58. 76 N.J. at 493, 388 A.2d at 611-12 (Clifford, J., dissenting) (quoting from 
Satkin's policy). 
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the insurance company would have no obligation to pay the Perez 
family. 
The majority of the court justifies disregarding the definition 
of "occurrence" because the parties to the suit agreed that the fac­
tual record was limited to the policy in evidence. 59 The policy in 
evidence did not contain a definition of "occurrence" because Am­
bassador's counsel failed to include the page containing defini­
tions. 60 Holding that it was bound by stipulations of fact,61 the 
court made its decision without referring to Ambassador's defini­
tion of the term. It thereby avoided any analysis of the provision 
which was intended by Ambassador to exclude coverage for in­
tended injuries. 62 
The majority's reasoning was justifiably attacked by both the 
concurring and dissenting opinions. 63 Even without Ambassador's 
definition of "occurrence,"64 the court should have examined the 
meaning and the reasons for the term's use. New Jersey's Rules of 
Evidence allow judicial notice to be taken of such terms 65 so long 
59. Id. at 481, 388 A.2d at 605. 
60. Id. at 493-94 n.l, 388 A.2d at 612 n.l. 
61. Id. Stipulations are agreements between attorneys regulating matters inci­
dental to the proceedings or trial. See Lewis v. The Orpheus, 15 F. Cas. 492 (D. 
Mass. 1858) (No. 8,330), afI'd, 30 F. Cas. 859 (C.C.D. Mass. 1861) (No. 18,l69); 
Southern Colonization Co. v. Howard Cole & Co., 185 Wis. 469, 201 N.W. 817 
(1925). They are not binding unless assented to by the parties or their representa­
tives and are usually required to be in writing. Holland Banking Co. v. Continental 
Nat. Bank, 9 F. Supp. 988 (W.O. Mo. 1934). It is generally held that a stipulation 
may be repudiated if it was inadvertently or mistakenly made, provided the motion 
is made in sufficient time to prevent prejudice to the opposite party. See, e.g., Miller 
v. Schafer, 102 Ariz. 457, 432 P.2d 585 (1967). Consequently, Ambassador's attorney 
could have moved that such stipulation be withdrawn. 
62. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text. 
63. The concurring opinion "is based on uneasiness over whether the majority 
opinion demonstrates coverage under the policy, given the definition of 'occur­
renee:" 76 N.J. at 487, 388 A.2d at 608 (Pashman, J., concurring). The dissent ob­
serves that "[clonspicuously absent from the majority's analysis ... is any discussion 
of the definition of 'oecurrence,' which the policy defines as 'an accident ... which 
results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from the 
standpoint of the insured: " 76 N.J. at 493, 388 A.2d at 611 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
Accompanying this statement the dissent notes: 
I do not understand how we can properiY-<Jr-intelligently decide this 
case without application of the policy's definition of 'occurrence: I would 
accept as part of the record so much of the insuring agreement filed with us 
as contains the definitions of terms used elsewhere in the policy, see R. 
2:5-4(a), or at the very least give the attorneys the opportunity to present any 
argument relating to the definition of occurrence as they might wish to 
make. 
Id. at 481-82 n.l, 388 A.2d at 612 n.l (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
64. See notes 57-58 supra and accompanying text. 
65. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:84A (West 1976). Rule 9 Facts and law which must or 
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as "sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy"66 are consulted. 
As an alternative to Ambassador's definition, the court could 
have construed the term as a layman would understand it. 67 In 
Wilkinson & Son, Inc. v. Providence Washington Insurance Co. ,68 
the New Jersey Superior Court held that in the absence of a defini­
tion in a policy, "the term must be given its plain, ordinary, and 
popular meaning and must be interpreted as understood by the av­
erage insured when purchasing the policy. "69 Thus, a layman 
might find "occurrence" defined as "[a] coming or happening; any 
incident or event, especially one that happens without being de­
signed or expected. "70 This definition provides the exclusionary lan­
guage that the New Jersey Supreme Court said did not exist. 
By failing to discuss the insurer's definition of "occurrence," 
the court missed the opportunity to clarify the standard of intent to 
be used in interpreting insurance policies. Because the insurer's 
definition of "occurrence" excluded intended injuries,71 the court, 
by giving effect to this language, could have squarely faced the is-
may be judicially noticed. 
(1) Judicial notice shall be taken ... of such specific facts and propositions 
of generalized knowledge as are so universally known that they cannot rea­
sonably be the subject of dispute. 
(2) Judicial notice may be taken, without request by a party, of ... (d) such 
facts as are so generally known or of such common notoriety within the area 
pertinent to the event that they cannot reasonably be the subject of dispute; 
and (e) specific facts and propositions of generalized knowledge which are 
capable of immediate determim•.tion by resort to sources of reasonably indis­
putable accuracy. 
N.J. STAT. ANN. ~ 2A:84A (West 1976). Rule 12 Judicial notice in proceedings subse­
quent to trial. 
(1) The failure or refusal of the judge to take judicial notice of a matter or to 
instruct the trier of fact with respect to it shall not preclude the judge from 
taking judicial notice of the matter in subsequent proceedings in the action. 
(2) The reviewing court in its discretion may take judicial notice of any mat­
ter specified in Rule 9, whether or not judicially noticed by the judge. 
66. N.J. STAT. ANN. ~ 2A:84A (West 1976). Rule 9. See note 65 supra. In his 
dissent, Judge Clifford turned to Webster's Third New International and Black's Law 
Dictionaries to help construe the term. 76 N.J. at 495, 388 A.2d at 612. (Clifford, J., 
dissenting). 
67. See generally Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provi­
sions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 (1970). 
68. 124 N.J. Super. 466, 307 A.2d 639 (1973). The Supreme Court construes 
"occurrence" to mean an event or incident. 76 N.J. at 482 n.2, 388 A.2d at 606 n.2. 
This definition, however, ignores the fundamental principle of insurance that loss 
must be fortuitous. 
69. 124 N.J. Super. at 469,307 A.2d at 641. 
70. Farmers & Merchants Nat'l Bank v. Arrington, 98 S.W.2d 378, 382 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1936) (emphasis added). 
71. 76 N.J. at 493,388 A.2d at 611-12. 
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sue whether Joseph Satkin intended his tenants to suffer injuries or 
death. Had it done so, the court would have found that it could 
provide insurance coverage to the Perez family despite this exclu­
sionary provision. 
American courts have used three distinct approaches in at­
tempting to define intent when construing insurance policies. 72 
Some courts have held that "intentional" refers to the volitional act 
which produces an injury.73 If the insured acted deliberately, the 
resulting injury is intentional and not accidental for purposes of the 
insurance policy. Other courts have held that intentional refers to 
the result achieved. Only where the insured meant to inflict the 
precise injury or degree of injury which in fact resulted should the 
injury be considered as not accidental. 74 Other courts have used an 
intermediate standard. These courts have held that "intentional" 
refers to the volitional performance of an act with a desire to cause 
some injury, although it need not necessarily be the precise injury 
or severity of damage that actually results. 75 
72. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240, 242 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). Com­
pare Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967) with Smith v. Moran, 61 
Ill. App. 2d 157,209 N.E.2d 18 (1965); Putman v. Zeluff, 372 Mich. 553, 127 NW.2d 
374 (1964); and Baldinger v. Conso!. Mut. Ins. Co. 15 App. Div.2d 526, 222 N.Y.S.2d 
736 (1961), afI'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1026, 183 N.E.2d 908, 230 N.Y.S.2d 25 (1962). In Kraus, 
the court held that an intentional injury exclusion clause will operate to relieve an 
insurer of its duty to indemnify under a liability policy where the nature of the in­
tentional acts of the insured is such that intent to cause harm may be inferred as a 
matter of law. In Smith, the Illinois Appellate Court allowed coverage to Glena M. 
Smith when she was wounded by a gun shot by Dorothy Moran. Since Moran had 
intended to shoot another waitress in the restaurant, Smith's injury was the 
unintentional result of an intended act. Similarly, the Putnam court held that a boy 
who shot at a dog to stop the onrush of the animal, did not intend to destroy it. Con­
sequently, insurance coverage was allowed under a comprehensive personal liability 
policy. The Baldinger court, in a tort action, held that insurance coverage existed 
when Allan Banks pushed Barbara Jane Baldinger and caused her injury. The court 
held that the injury was the unintended result of an intended act. Since the exclu­
sion clause was unclear and ambiguous and because the clause did not express an 
intention to exclude from liability unintentional injuries resulting from deliberate 
acts, coverage was provided. 
73. Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967); Wigginton v. Lum­
bermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So.2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1964). See notes 77-82 infra and 
accompanying text. 
74. Hawkeye Sec. Ins. Co. v. Shields, 31 Mich. App. 649, 187 N.W.2d 894 
(1971); Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 
1973), cer!. denied, 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Blackburn, 477 P.2d 62 (Okla. 1970). See notes 87-95 infra and accompanying text. 
75. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Continental 
W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121 (Minn. 1976); Oakes v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
Co., 137 N.J. Super. 365, 349 A.2d 102 (App. Div. 1975). See notes 83-86 infra and 
accompanying text. 
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Some courts have held that if a volitional act produced an in­
jury, the exclusionary language for intentionally caused injuries 
applies. 76 The Restatement (Second) of Torts77 adopts the position 
that if the insured acted, the resulting injury is intentional. This 
view holds that one intends the natural and probable consequences 
of his acts. Using such a standard, insurance coverage could be 
denied when an insured's intentional act resulted in an unintended 
injury. 78 
This view has been roundly rejected by the courts in liability 
insurance policy cases. 79 These courts recognize that although most 
acts are intentional in some sense, many unintended results flow 
from intentional acts. 80 Another reason for rejecting the Restate­
ment position lies in the way courts construe insurance policies. 
When the language of an exclusionary clause is ambiguous, any 
doubts as to its meaning are resolved against the insurer who 
drafted the policy and who, therefore, could have prevented such 
ambiguity.81 Since one purpose of liability insurance is to protect 
injured third parties, as between the liability insurer of a culpable 
actor and an innocent third party, it is better to place the risk of 
loss on the insured when intent to injure is unclear. 82 In Ambassa­
dor, the language of Satkin's policy did not expressly exclude cov­
erage for unintended injuries which resulted from a deliberate act. 
76. Kraus v. Allstate Ins. Co., 379 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1967); Wigginton v. Lum­
bermens Mut. Cas. Co., 169 So. 2d 170 (La. Ct. App. 1964). 
77. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965) provides: 

§ 8A. Intent 

The word "intent" is used throughout the Restatement of this Subject to de­

note that the actor desires to cause consequences of his act, or that he be­

lieves that the consequences are substantially certain to result from it. 

78. Judge Clifford followed this approach in his dissenting opinion. 76 N.J. at 
494,388 A.2d at 612 (Clifford, J., dissenting). 
79. Id. at 488, 388 A.2d at 609 (Pashman, J., concurring). See Grange Mut. Cas. 
Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 159 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Cloud v. Shelby Mut. 
Ins. Co., 248 So. 2d 217, 218 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971); Continental W. Ins. Co. v. 
Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 124 (Minn. 1976); Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co. v. Blackburn, 
477 P.2d 62, 65 (Okla. 1970); City of Bums v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or. 
364, 371, 434 P.2d 465, 469 (1967). 
80. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir. 
1978). An insured farmer fired his gun in the air to scare some boys who were steal­
ing watermelons and killed one of the boys. Garnishment was allowed against his in­
surance company. 
81. Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 98, 213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1973). In an 
action by a hatcheck girl who had been pushed by a patron against a metal message 
rack attached to the wall, the Minnesota Supreme Court held that, where no bodily 
injury was intended, such assault did not come within the exclusionary clause for in­
tentionally caused injuries. See note 94 infra. 
82. 76 N.J. at 489,388 A.2d at 609 (Pashman, J., concurring). 
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The limits of the insurance policy, therefore, should be resolved 
against the insurer so that insurance coverage will be provided. 
This would not be possible, however, if the Restatement position 
were adopted in construing Satkin's insurance policy. 
An intermediate standard for intent requires the volitional per­
formance of an act with an intent to cause injury.83 Under this 
view, intent is established either by showing an actual intent to in­
jure, or by showing the nature and character of the act to be such 
that intent to cause harm to the other party may be inferred as a 
matter of law. 84 Applying this standard in the instant case, Satkin's 
arson conviction could be used to establish such intent thereby 
excluding insurance coverage. Certainly, one who starts a fire in an 
old, multistoried building at 3 a. m., without warning any of the in­
habitants, should know that some of those persons could be seri­
ously injured or killed. 
This standard requires the insured to intend some injury, even 
if it is not the precise injury which results, before his conduct will 
be deemed intentional for purposes of denying insurance coverage. 
Nevertheless, the scope of insurance coverage is still ambiguous. 
The standard remains subject to the criticism that many unin­
tended consequences flow from deliberate acts. 85 This would still 
exclude coverage to many innocent third parties and, therefore, 
fails to take into account the strong public policy of providing com­
pensation to innocent victims. 86 
83. Lyons v. Hartford Ins. Group, 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 
1973), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 322, 315 A.2d 411 (1974). See Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 
332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975). In this declaratory judgment action, the court 
held that, where two neighboring farmers had had a dispute and one had hit the 
other, the policy, which excluded liability for bodily injury caused intentionally, was 
ambiguous. Further, the court decided the policy would be construed to exclude 
coverage which was intended to cause injury. Although the defendant acted in self­
defense and did not intend the injury to his neighbor, his actions fell within the ex­
clusion. [d. 
84. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Continental 
W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976); Oakes v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co., 137 N.J. Super. 365, 367, 349 A.2d 102, 103 (App. Div. 1975); City of Burns 
v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or. 364, 369,434 P.2d 465, 468 (1967). 
85. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Worthington, 405 F.2d 683, 688 (8th Cir. 
1978). 
86. See note 35, supra. In addition, it should be noted that this second standard 
is usually used in assault and battery cases where the insured specifically intends an 
assault but not the actual injury sustained. Thus, the question in such cases is not 
whether any harm was intended, but rather the severity of the harm intended. Since 
Satkin's act was not in the nature of an assault, these cases do not apply. This view is 
also often espoused in dicta by courts which go on to apply the principal that for the 
policy's exclusionary provisions to apply, the injury must be the intended result of 
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The third standard of intent, announced in Lyons v. Hartford 
Insurance Group,87 is the one used by a majority of courts88 and 
adopted by Judge Pashman in his concurring opinion. 89 Following 
this view, "coverage exists under insuring and exclusion clauses 
. . . for the unintended results of an intentional act, but not for 
damages assessed because of an injury which was intended to be 
inflicted. "90 The tortfeasor, therefore, must have an actual subjec­
tive desire to inflict a specific injury before insurance coverage is 
denied his victim. 91 "The rationale underlying the general rule is 
that the insurance contract excludes only intended injuries and 
there is no need or public policy justification for expanding this ex­
clusion through presumptions of intent. "92 Certainly, sound public 
policy is furthered by compensating innocent victims. 93 Further­
more, if any term in an insurance contract is ambiguous, it should 
be construed against the insurance company which drafted the pol­
icy.94 When these cases occur, courts will interpret the insurance 
an intentional act. See, e.g., City of Bums v. Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or. 
364, 434 P.2d 465 (1967); Vanguard Ins. Co. v. CantreIl, 18 Ariz. App. 486, 543 P.2d 
962 (1973). 
87. 125 N.J. Super. 239, 310 A.2d 485 (App. Div. 1973), cert. denied, 64 N.J. 
322,315 A.2d 411 (1974). Lyons, who had been a police officer for 20 years, shot and 
killed a man after a long drinking bout. Dazed from the alcohol and a recent beating, 
he drew his gun to fire a warning shot, without an intent to kill or inflict bodily 
harm. Although he would have had no right to coverage had he meant to maim or 
kill, Lyons only intended to fire a warning shot and accidentally fired prematurely. 
Therefore, insurance coverage was allowed. 
88. E.g., Smith v. Moran, 61 Ill. App. 2d 157, 209 N.E.2d 18 (1965). Putman v. 
ZelufI, 372 Mich. 553, 127 N.W.2d 374 (1964); Morrill v. Gallagher, 370 Mich. 578, 
122 N.W.2d 687 (1963); Baldinger v. Consolidated Mut. Ins. Co., 15 App. Div. 2d 
526, 222 N.Y.S.2d 736, afJ'd, 11 N.Y.2d 1026, 183 N.E.2d 908, 230 N.Y.S.2d 25 
(1962). 
89. 76 N.J. at 608,388 A.2d at 609. 
90. 125 N.J. Super. at 245, 310 A.2d at 488. "It is not sufficient that the in­
sured's intentional, albeit wrongful, act has resulted in unintended harm; it is the 
harm itself that must be intended before the exclusion will apply." City of Bums v. 
Northwestern Mut. Ins. Co., 248 Or. 364, 369, 434 P.2d 465, 468 (1967). 
91. Id. 
92. Continental W, Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976). 
93. See note 35 supra. 
94. Home Ins. Co. v. Neilsen, 332 N.E.2d 240 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975); Deodato v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., 143 N.]. Super. 396, 363 A.2d 361 (1976); Hanover Ins. Group v. 
Cameron, 122 N.J. Super. 51, 298 A.2d 715, (Ch. 1973); Bowler v. Fidelity & Cas. 
Co., 53 N.J. 313, 250 A.2d 580 (1969); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Mosley, 41 Ohio App. 
2d 113, 322 N.E.2d 693 (1974). Adherence to this method of policy construction is 
the result of the typical disparity between the bargaining positions of the insurer and 
the insured. The insurer's opportunity to draft the proposed terms of the agreement 
is also an opportunity for overreaching. Insurance contracts continue to be contracts 
of adhesion under which the insured is left little choice beyond electing among 
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contract to provide protection to the victims. 95 
Despite Satkin's conviction for felony-murder, the third stan­
dard would provide insurance protection to the Perez family. For 
the felony-murder rule to apply, it is not necessary to prove that 
the death or even the act resulting in death was intended. 96 The 
death may have been quite unexpected. 97 Consequently, although 
Satkin's arson may have been in wanton and wilful disregard of the 
safety of his tenants, it does not follow that he subjectively in­
tended to kill or injure anyone. As the court stated: 
The whole purpose behind Satkin's act of arson was to defraud 
the insurance company and to obtain payment for the value of 
his property. He never desired that his tenants suffer injury or 
death. While he certainly displayed a callous disregard for their 
safety, he did not want to see them harmed by his act. Thus, 
Satkin did not "expect or intend" the deaths of his tenants in the 
subjective sense that is required for his act to be excluded from 
the definition of "occurrence. "98 
The New Jersey Court concluded that Satkin's insurance pol­
icy obligated Ambassador to pay on Satkin's behalf those sums 
which Satkin was legally indebted to pay for the death of Marilyn 
Ortega Perez. 99 Because this indicates the strong public policy fa­
voring compensating victims, the result is a desirable one. Con­
spicuously absent from the court's discussion, however, was any 
mention of whether the policy provides coverage given the defini­
tion of "occurrence."lOO The court avoids any analysis of policy lan­
guage which was intended by the insurance company to exclude in-
standardized provisions offered to him, even when the standard forms are prescribed 
by public officials rather than insurers. In most instances, regulation is relatively 
weak and even the provisions prescribed or approved by legislative or administrative 
action are in essence adoptions of proposals made by insurers' draftsmen. Keeton, In­
surance Law Rights at Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961 
(1970). See Appleman, "Jabberwocky" Revisited-Or, What Does My Policy Cover? 
1977 INS. L. J. 279; See also Hollman, Insurance as a Contract of Adhesion, 1978 
INS. L. J. 274. The insured usually has no participation in the arrangement or selec­
tion of words used, yet, the language of the insurance contract is selected with con­
siderable care and deliberation by legal advisors and experts employed by and acting 
exclusively in the interest of the insurance company. Therefore, it is the insurance 
company who is at fault for any uncertainty. Id. at 276. 
95. See Appleman, supra note 94, at 281. 
96. R. PERKINS, PERKINS ON CRIMINAL LAW 42 (2d ed. 1969). 
97. Id. 
98. 76 N.J. at 491-92, 388 A.2d at 611. (Pashman, J., concurring). 
99. Id. at 486,388 A.2d at 608 (Schreiber, J.). 
100. Id. (Pashman, J., concurring). 
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surance coverage for Injuries which are "either expected or 
intended from the standpoint of the insured. "101 
Because the court chose to disregard Ambassador's definition 
of "occurrence," the court also avoided any clarification of the 
standard of intent to be used in interpreting insurance contracts. 
Although three distinct approaches have been used,102 most courts 
require proof of an actual, subjective desire to bring about the spe­
cific injury which is suffered before the injured party will be 
denied insurance protection. l03 This position has the advantage of 
providing maximum insurance protection to innocent victims with­
out altering any provisions in the insurance contract. This standard 
101. Judge Clifford in his dissent argues that even if the policy in question can 
be read to provide coverage in its insuring agreement, there is an implied exclusion 
for the situation in which the insured bums a residential dwelling. He further con­
tends that this implied exclusion is based, not on public policy, but on the expectan­
cies of the parties to the insurance contract. Id. at 495, 388 A.2d at 612-13. He quotes 
from Professor Robert E. Keeton's Insurance Law: 
First, insurance contracts do not ordinarily cover economic detriment 
occurring so regularly that it is regarded as a cost rather than a risk of that 
activity or enterprise. Second, insurance contracts do not cover economic 
detriment that is not fortuitous from the point of view of the person (usual­
ly the insured) whose detriment is asserted as the basis of the insurer's lia­
bility. 
R. KEETON, INSURANCE LAW § 5.3(a), at 278 (1971) (footnote omitted). Professor 
Keeton, however, specifically mentions a solution, similar to that adopted by the ma­
jority opinion, to provide coverage to an innocent victim: 
Certainly fidelity to the principle that loss must be fortuitous may be pre­
served without precluding liability of the insurer to the victim. The victim, 
as to whom loss is fortuitous, can be allowed protection without giving cov­
erage to a tortfeasor who intentionally injured him. For example, the insurer 
may be required to pay the victim but granted a right of reimbursement 
from the tortfeasor. 
R KEETON, !NSURA_NCE LAW § 5.4(b), at 291 (1971) (citations omitted). 
Although this remedy does adhere to the principle that loss must be fortuitous 
from the standpoint of the insured, other considerations must be examined. Current 
legislative trends seek to spread loss rather than fix responsibility. Veitch, Criminal­
ity Insured: Law and Judicial Policy in Canada, 44 INS. COUNSEL J. 73 (1977). It 
may also be true that the threat of criminal prosecution is a much better deterrent to 
criminal conduct than is the denial of insurance coverage under a liability policy. Id. 
Nevertheless, giving an insurer a cause of action against an insured may be an inade­
quate remedy. For example, if the insured has gone bankrupt, this cause of action is 
worthless. The time and expense required for litigation may also preclude an insurer 
from bringing an action against the insured when small amounts are involved. It 
should be recognized that denying insurance proceeds to a wrongdoer is not a sanc­
tion against criminal conduct but a matter of contract. By reforming the insurance 
contract to provide coverage for criminal acts, other insureds will be forced to bear 
the cost of such illegal conduct by paying increased insurance rates. 
102. See notes 72-95 supra and accompanying text. 
103. [d. 
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is further rationalized as a means to extend the insurance contract 
to its limits. There is no need or public policy justification for ex­
panding the scope of exclusions through presumptions of intent. 104 
Such a standard has the added advantage of putting insurers on no­
tice of the degree of specificity courts require to prove intent when 
construing insurance policies. Without such a clarification, insur­
ance companies are given little guidance in drafting their policies 
and, consequently, face more litigation to clarify these contract 
terms in the future. 
Had the New Jersey Supreme Court not wished to enter the 
intent imbroglio, however, the majority opinion still could have 
provided a more satisfactory analysis to reach its result. First, the 
remedy the court granted to Ambassador should properly be 
termed a right to indemnification from its insured rather than a 
right of subrogation. Viewing Ambassador as a subrogation case 
yields the anomalous result that the insurance company was subro­
gated to a cause of action against its own insured. Subrogation does 
not embrace this situation. By analyzing the case in terms of subro­
gation, the New Jersey court created an unnecessary source of con­
fusion for courts seeking to follow Ambassador. 
Second, the comprehensive liability policy issued to Joseph 
Satkin was not an indemnity contract, but a contract to pay third 
parties in the event Satkin was responsible for the injuries sus­
tained by such third parties. Ambassador's obligations under the 
contract were not conditioned on Satkin first being held legally lia­
ble for damages. Under this view of the contract, the court could 
have required Ambassador to pay the Perez family the proceeds 
from Satkin's policy. It then could have implied a right of indemni­
fication. l05 The right of indemnity depends on the principle that 
everyone is responsible for the consequences of his own wrong, 
and if others are compelled to pay damages that ought to have 
been paid by the wrongdoer, they may recover from him.l06 This 
implied cause of action would, therefore, effectuate the policy of 
deterring intentional wrongdoing by making the wrongdoer suffer 
the financial consequences of his wilful act. 
R. Stephen Lee 
104. Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, 244 N.W.2d 121, 125 (Minn. 1976). 
105. Westville Land Co. v. Handle, 112 N.J.L. 447,171 A. 520 (N.J. 1934). 
106. Mayer v. Fairlawn Jewish Center, 38 N.J. 549, 186 A.2d 274 (1962). 
